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BEING FORCED TO CODE IN THE TECHNOLOGY 
ERA AS A VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION AGAINST COMPELLED SPEECH 
Adrianna Oddo+ 
On December 2, 2015, fourteen people were killed and twenty-one others 
were wounded when two assailants opened fire at the Inland Regional Center in 
San Bernardino, California.1  Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik fired 
sixty-five to seventy-five rounds in the center before fleeing the scene.2  Law 
enforcement received a tip about the suspects’ location, which resulted in a 
police chase.3  Following a shootout with the police, both suspects were killed 
and, “[t]he FBI investigated the mass shooting as an ‘act of terrorism’ and 
determined that the two killers were not part of any terrorist network or cell. . . 
.”4  During its investigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
discovered the shooters’ broken cell phones and it appeared as though the 
shooters attempted to destroy their digital fingerprints.5  The massacre forced 
the nation to focus on terrorism and gun policy, but it later shed light on a more 
technical issue.6 
In February 2015, two months into its investigation, the FBI encountered a 
problem accessing the information on the shooters’ phones.7  The FBI director 
informed Congress that after two months the FBI could not unlock the terrorists’ 
phones despite diligent efforts to circumvent Apple, Incorporated’s (Apple) 
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 1. Larisa Epatko, Everything We Know About the San Bernardino Shooting, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Dec. 3, 2015, 9:27 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/everything-we-kno 
w-about-the-san-bernardino-shooting/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to San 
Bernardino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bernardinoshooter/2016/02/ 
16/69b903ee-d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html; see generally Jim Finkle & Dustin Volz, 
U.S. Tech Companies Unite Behind Apple Ahead of Iphone Encryption Ruling In re Search of Apple 
iPhone, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/apple-encryption-google-faceb 
ook-idUSKCN0W527Y. 
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encryption technology.8 The United States Department of Justice sought to 
obtain this information by ordering Apple to “disable the feature that wipes data 
on [an iPhone] after 10 incorrect tries at entering a password.”9  Apple 
vehemently resisted the Justice Department’s order and the American public 
became divided over the legal implications of technology, privacy, and 
encryption.10  Apple CEO, Tim Cook, expressed concerns and explained his 
dissent to the Justice Department’s order in a letter to Apple customers.11  
Cook’s main concern with rewriting encryption software was that it would create 
a “chilling” effect on the privacy of Apple consumers.12  Apple bases its 
opposition on two arguments.  The government does not have authority under 
the All Writs Act of 1789 to force Apple to unlock its phones, and compelling 
Apple to violate its company philosophy infringes on the right against compelled 
speech.13 
Apple committed itself to do everything possible to protect customers’ data 
and personal information.14  To achieve this, Apple uses encryption software to 
protect the vast amounts of information consumers store on their iPhones and 
has additionally “put that data out of [its] own reach, because [it] believe[s] the 
contents of your iPhone are none of [its] business.”15  While the theory behind 
data encryption is good for consumers and their personal information, it presents 
a problem for law enforcement that may need to gain access to devices for 
                                                 
 8. Dustin Volz & Mark Hosenball, FBI Director Says Investigators Unable to Unlock San 
Bernardino Shooter’s Phone Content, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
california-shooting-encryption-idUSKCN0VI22A. 
 9. Nakashima, supra note 7. 
 10. Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San Bernardino Gunman’s 
iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/technology/apple-
timothy-cook-fbi-san-bernardino.html. The divide even extends to the Obama administration itself 
where “some of the president’s most senior aides are staking out a variety of positions on the issue.” 
Although the administration repeatedly stated there is no “serious internal disagreement about 
policy,” the actions of agency officials, such as the Director of the FBI and the Defense Secretary, 
indicate conflicting positions. Michael D. Shear & David E. Sanger, Competing Interests on 
Encryption Divide Top Obama Officials, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/03/06/us/politics/competing-interests-on-encryption-divide-top-obama-officials.html. 
 11. Lichtblau & Benner, supra note 10; Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE 
(Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/; Answers to your questions about Apple 
and security, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/answers/ (last viewed Oct. 17, 2017). 
 12. Cook, supra note 11. 
 13. Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, 
and Opposition to Government’s Motion To Compel Assistance, at 14–15, 33–34, In re the Search 
of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, 
California License Plate 35KGD203 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) (No. CM 16-10), 2016 WL 767457 
[hereinafter Apple Inc.’s Motion To Vacate Order]; Adam Satariano, Apple-FBI Fight Asks: is 
Code Protected as Free Speech?, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2016-02-24/apple-fbi-fight-asks-is-code-protected-as-free-speech. 
 14. Cook, supra note 11. 
 15. Id.; see also Apple, Inc., iOS Security (May 2016), https://www.apple.com/business/docs 
/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf. 
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investigations.16  After recognizing the issue that encryption presents, the 
government sought access to these devices by, among other routes, compelling 
Apple to write a “backdoor” to the iPhone through a court order.17  Compelling 
companies to write new software for their products has First Amendment 
implications that courts need to address; however, every case that has made it to 
court has been dismissed before a ruling can be issued.18  Without a decision or 
definitive answer regarding these investigations, consumers are unaware that the 
privacy, security, and safety of their devices may not be protected.19 
Using a court order to compel Apple—or any company—to assist in an 
investigation is not necessarily illegal and alone does not violate any of the 
company’s rights.  But requiring Apple to create a backdoor to its software—
something it is fervently and fundamentally opposed to—may violate the 
company’s rights.20  The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”21  
Since the First Amendment’s passage in the late 1700s, American law has 
shaped and defined the protections and guarantees of the First Amendment.22  
Due to recent technological advancements, courts have held that computer code 
is speech and have provided guidance on the degree of protection that computer 
code is afforded.23  Courts have also addressed ancillary speech matters, such as 
compelled speech and compelled affirmations, which further contemplate the 
nature of protections afforded to computer code as a matter of constitutional 
law.24  The technological advancements of Apple’s encryption software and the 
unique conundrum presented by attempting to gain access to their devices 
warrant an evaluation of the First Amendment in this context.25  This evaluation 
is necessary not only with regard to an order creating a backdoor to Apple’s 
product, but also with regard to requiring Apple to authorize the program to 
function on its devices despite Apple’s fundamental opposition to everything 
that program stands for.26 
                                                 
 16. Jeff John Roberts, Locked Apple Devices are Piling Up in Police Evidence Rooms, 
FORTUNE (Nov. 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/11/17/locked-apple-devices-are-piling-up-in-
police-evidence-rooms/. 
 17. Cook, supra note 11. 
 18. Satariano, supra note 13. 
 19. See generally Cook, supra note 11 (describing uncertainty and availability of data 
protection without definite legal precedent). 
 20. Satariano, supra note 13; Cook, supra note 11. 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 22. See generally About the First Amendment, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/about-
the-first-amendment (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (tracing the history of shaping and defining the 
protections guaranteed by the First Amendment). 
 23. Satariano, supra note 13. 
 24. See generally About the First Amendment, supra note 22 (describing ancillary speech 
matters covered by the courts). 
 25. Satariano, supra note 13. 
 26. Id.; see generally Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 13, at 1–3. 
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Not all speech is afforded the same protection under the First Amendment.27  
Cases throughout the past 200 years have determined what speech is and is not 
protected in addition to how much protection is actually given.  Courts must 
ultimately consider the critical distinctions between pure speech and expressive 
conduct regarding whether computer code is speech.28  With respect to questions 
regarding computer code, courts must further distinguish whether the speech in 
question is source code or object code.29  Another caveat to the First Amendment 
is the fundamental right of the American people to be protected from 
government compulsion of any kind of speech.30  Previous decisions 
surrounding computer code and compelled speech serve as a framework to 
analyze cases that arise due to recent technological advancements. 
This Note discusses why, under First Amendment law, Apple should not be 
required to create code that circumvents its encryption software to assist the FBI 
in obtaining information stored on legally seized Apple products. It begins with 
a description of the relevant law surrounding the development of the Free Speech 
doctrine in regards to computer code.  This Note then analyzes the distinctions 
the courts have recognized between source code and object code when assigning 
proper constitutional protections.  Next, this Note explores compelled speech 
and compelled authorization in relation to the First Amendment.  In light of the 
Supreme Court’s precedent, this Note explores the FBI’s reasoning for 
compelling Apple’s assistance in gaining access to seized phones, and Apple’s 
justifications for resisting those orders.  Finally, this Note argues that the 
government violates Apple’s First Amendment rights by compelling them to 
create a backdoor to its software encryption because it is both compelled speech 
and a compelled affirmation.  Finding otherwise would have severe implications 
for the future of Americans’ personal privacy and security. 
                                                 
 27. Jorge R. Roig, Decoding First Amendment Coverage of Comput. Source Code in the Age 
of Youtube, Facebook, & the Arab Spring, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 319, 325–27 (2012). 
 28. See generally Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal 
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1277, 1282–85 (2005) (considering arguments differentiating speech and conduct as speech); 
R. George Wright, What Counts as Speech in the First Place?: Determining the Scope of the Free 
Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1221, 1251 (2010). 
 29. 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, Trade Secrets Law § 9:12 (Oct. 2016 ed.); Roig, supra note 27, at 
327–28; see also Katherine A. Moerke, Free Speech to a Machine? Encryption Software Source 
Code is Not Constitutionally Protected “Speech” Under the First Amendment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 
1007, 1017–19 (2000). 
 30. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding “New Hampshire may 
not require appellees to display the state motto”); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943). The Supreme Court recognized that “speech does not lose its protection 
because of the corporate identity of the speaker,” indicating that Apple’s speech is still guaranteed 
protection. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) 
(citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)). 
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I.  THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ELUSIVENESS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH 
The United States Constitution was ratified in 1788 and “is the supreme law 
of the United States.”31  In addition to providing governance guidelines for the 
role of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches, it set forth the 
relationships and rights between different states and the federal government.32  
Arguably, the most important and controversial part of the Constitution, today 
and at ratification, is the Bill of Rights, which contains the rights of the People.33 
Five of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the People by the Bill of Rights 
are established in the First Amendment.  The First Amendment provides that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”34  The 
Framers did not initially think these rights needed to be explicitly stated;35 
however, based on the expansive case law of the First Amendment it can now 
be argued otherwise. 
Despite being ratified in 1788,36 the Constitution remains the governing 
document followed by the United States today.  While the language contained 
in the text remains the same, the meaning of those words has been expanded, 
narrowed, and applied in many different contexts. 
One provision that has evolved significantly is the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment that provides “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech. . . .”37  Over time the courts have been faced with the issue 
of what qualified as “speech” when the framers passed the First Amendment.  
The Supreme Court did not hear many First Amendment or freedom of speech 
cases during the 100 years following the Bill of Rights’ ratification because a 
majority of “federal judges [found] that the Bill of Rights [did] not apply to the 
states.”38  Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment ultimately led to an 
increase of freedom of speech cases tried in federal courts during the Twentieth 
Century.39  This proliferation of freedom of speech issues continues in the courts 
today. 
                                                 
 31. The Constitution, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/constitution 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2017). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See generally Wright, supra note 28, at 1219–21 (touching on constitutional 
controversies, which stem from the document’s dearth of terminological definition); see also The 
Constitution, supra note 31 (“[T]he Bill of Rights contains rights that many today consider to be 
fundamental to America”). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 35. See The Constitution, supra note 31 (“One of the principal points of contention between 
the Federalists and Anti-Federalists was the lack of an enumeration of basic civil rights in the 
Constitution”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 38. First Amendment Timeline, THE FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, http://www.first 
amendmentcenter.org/first-amendment-timeline (last visited Oct. 27, 2017). 
 39. Id. 
216 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:211 
A.  The Expansion of the Definition of Speech in the Technology Era has Not 
Clarified Any Existing Uncertainty, it has Only Created New Ones. 
For two centuries courts, judges, and scholars attempted to focus the definition 
of “speech” within the context of the First Amendment.40  When it comes to 
determining the meaning of speech, there are varying opinions of what the First 
Amendment actually protects.41  Despite this variance, it has been determined 
that “[e]ven dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic 
expression, has been accorded First Amendment protection.”42  As technology 
continues to develop, courts face situations where this technology is using or 
creating a language, which may or may not be considered speech.43  These 
technological advancements, especially in regards to computer coding, 
prompted courts to address whether computer code is or is not considered 
speech.  As courts issue decisions on computer code cases, a common factor is 
their focus on the information that the code conveys.44 
The Sixth Circuit found in Junger v. Daley that the First Amendment protects 
computer source code.45  In Junger, a professor sought injunctive relief on First 
Amendment grounds to enable him to distribute encryption software through his 
class website.46  To address the First Amendment claim, the court evaluated 
whether the code Junger wanted to post on his website had speech-like 
qualities.47  While the case was in the District Court, the government 
distinguished source code from object code as it applies to First Amendment 
protection.48  Source code is expressed in a type of coding language, which can 
be understood by people with relevant experience.49  Object code is the computer 
                                                 
 40. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Moerke, 
supra note 29, at 1010–18 (providing a preliminary overview of specific types of speech and 
conduct that have historically been protected by First Amendment Jurisprudence in addition to the 
analysis of when courts found government “abridging” the freedom of speech). 
 41. See generally Wright, supra note 28, at 1218–20 (explaining the need for a comprehensive 
analysis to determine what actually counts as speech under the First Amendment). 
 42. Universal City Studios, Inc., 273 F.3d at 446. 
 43. See generally Moerke, supra note 29, at 1018–20, 1024–27 (discussing cases regarding 
source and object code as well as encryption in relation to the First Amendment). 
 44. Id. at 1025–27 (detailing how courts determined whether computer coding constituted 
speech based on the coded information’s expression of ideas, like other forms of protected 
communication). 
 45. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 482 (6th Cir. 2000). The lower court “found that 
encryption source code is not sufficiently expressive to be protected by the First Amendment[;]” 
however, after oral arguments, the 6th Circuit “reverse[d] the district court and remand[ed] this 
case for further consideration.”  Id. 
 46. Id. at 484. 
 47. Id. at 484–85. 
 48. Id. at 483 (explaining source code is a set of instructions written in “a specialized 
programing language, such as BASIC, C, or Java”); see also Roig, supra note 27, at 327 (indicating 
additional types of “language” in which source code can be used for communication, including 
“C++, Fortran, COBOL, Python, Perl, and Java”). 
 49. Junger, 209 F.3d at 483. 
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instructions that direct a computer through a sequence of 0s and 1s.50  The issue 
with this distinction is that source code must be transferred into object code for 
a computer system to understand it.51  The issue became whether source code, 
which is what the encryption software was, was guaranteed First Amendment 
protections.52 
In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit referenced a Supreme Court holding that “‘all 
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance’ including those 
concerning ‘the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts’ have the full 
protection of the First Amendment.”53  The Court went further to explain that 
First Amendment protection also extends to symbolic conduct, including 
conduct that is considered expressive and functional.54  In looking toward 
Supreme Court decisions, the Sixth Circuit ultimately decided that “[b]ecause 
computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information 
and ideas about computer programing . . .  it is protected by the First 
Amendment.”55  The Sixth Circuit found that source code contains both 
expressive and functional features, which complicates the determination of First 
Amendment protection.56  However, the court did not address the level of 
judicial scrutiny to be applied because Junger needed standing “to bring a facial 
challenge” to the statute that prohibits him from posting the encryption code on 
his website.57  In a similar case to Junger, the District Court in Bernstein v. U.S. 
Department of State found that encryption code, which required the use of a 
computer source code, is considered speech.58 
While the court in Junger considered the distinction between object and 
source code to determine the First Amendment, the court in Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley59 conducted a different analysis but reached a similar 
conclusion regarding code as speech.  The court in Universal City Studios first 
determined that “communication does not lose constitutional protection as 
‘speech’ simply because it is expressed in the language of computer code.”60  
                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 484. 
 53. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
 54. Id. (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)) (“This protection is not reserved 
for purely expressive communication. The Supreme Court has recognized First Amendment 
protection for symbolic conduct, such as draft-card burning, that has both functional and expressive 
features.”). 
 55. Id. at 485. The court also analogized computer code to musical scores, noting that while 
many people cannot read musical compositions, musicians prefer to communicate through their 
music. Id.; see also Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N. D. Cal. 1996). 
 56. Junger, 209 F.3d at 484. 
 57. Id. at 485. 
 58. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1436 (“For the purposes of First Amendment analysis, this 
court finds that source code is speech.”). 
 59. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 60. Id. 
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The Second Circuit briefly addressed source and object code when it determined 
that the distinction was not as relevant as the court suggested in Junger, asserting 
that the readable nature of code by programmers qualifies it as communications 
protected by the First Amendment.61  Thus, an inquiry into “the ease with which 
[computer code] is comprehended” becomes irrelevant in determining whether 
First Amendment protects code.62 
The court further found “a programmer might communicate through code: to 
another programmer” and that limiting the First Amendment protection afforded 
to code “would impede their exchange of ideas and expression.”63  Taking its 
analysis a step further, the Universal City Studios court contemplated the scope 
of the First Amendment protection in regards to the code’s usage and purpose.  
While the petitioners argued source code should be treated as pure speech, the 
court did not agree.64  The Second Circuit decided that code in this case was a 
combination of non-speech and speech based on the functional and expressive 
elements.65  Unlike a recipe or blueprint that serve as instructions in specific 
fields, “computer code can instantly cause a computer to accomplish tasks and 
instantly render the results of those tasks available throughout the world via the 
internet.”66  The scrutiny that applies to computer code as speech is less relevant 
to the topic of this Note, but the Second Circuit’s holding that “computer code 
conveying information is ‘speech’ within the meaning of the First Amendment” 
is analytically critical for determining computer code’s constitutional 
protection.67 
B.  Despite the Vague Definition and Spotty Application of the Term “Speech,” 
Protection Against Compelled Speech is More Definite. 
Although the Court continues to grapple with interpretation of the word 
“speech,” it remains steadfast that the purpose of the First Amendment is to 
protect speech.  Justice Jackson famously discussed a main concern of the First 
Amendment in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.68  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Jackson held that the forced salute of the American flag 
                                                 
 61. Id. at 446. The court emphasized that “the ease with which a work is comprehended is 
irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry.” This supports the court’s notion that the mere prospect of 
a programmer being able to understand such code makes it communicative, and is thus considered 
speech, regardless of its complex nature.  Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 448–49. 
 64. Id. at 451. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. The court concedes that human interaction may be something as small “as a single 
click of a mouse,” but nonetheless requires that computer code be evaluated based on its functional 
and expressive elements.  Id. 
 67. Id. at 449–50; see also 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1122 (2017). 
 68. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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in the classroom was a constitutional violation of the First Amendment.69  Justice 
Jackson went on to state, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox . . . 
or force citizens to confess by words or act their faith therein.”70  This decision 
was the first of many dealing with conduct as compelled speech under the First 
Amendment. 
In Wooley v. Maynard,71 the Court considered compelled speech when Mr. 
Maynard and his wife sought relief because they found a New Hampshire law 
requiring license plates to display the state motto to be unconstitutional.72  The 
Maynard’s believed the New Hampshire motto, “Live Free or Die,” to be 
morally, religiously, and politically against their beliefs as Jehovah’s 
Witnesses.73  The Supreme Court held “the right of freedom of thought protected 
by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak 
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”74  The Court found that 
forcing an individual to publicly display an ideal that he or she finds 
fundamentally unacceptable violates that individual’s Constitutional rights.75  
The Court asserted that the government may not restrict what the People say and 
further, that the government may not compel what “protects” the People–that is, 
“the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority.”76  
When the government compels speech, it “invades the sphere of intellect and 
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to 
reserve from all official control.”77 
The Court in Wooley then determined whether the state had a convincing 
reason to justify such compelled actions.78  After considering the proffered 
governmental interest for enforcement of this statute, the Court began its 
conclusion by reasserting a previous holding, “even though the governmental 
purpose [was] legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued . . . 
when the end can be more narrowly achieved.”79 
                                                 
 69. Id.  Justice Jackson opines that the forced salute in this case not only exceeds the school 
board’s authority, it “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”  Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633–34). 
 72. Id. at 707–08. 
 73. Id. at 707. 
 74. Id. at 714 (referencing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633–34). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 715 (referencing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642). The Court noted the importance of 
protecting varying viewpoints of all of its citizens, even those contrary to the majority, and the 
government must act consistent with such principles.  Id. at 715. 
 77. Id. at 715 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642). 
 78. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716. 
 79. Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).  The Court went on to hold 
that “where the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, 
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The Court later recognized the limitations placed on the government when 
compelling corporations to speak in a manner inconsistent with the company’s 
business principles and viewpoints.  In Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. 
Public Utilities Commission of California,80 the Court held that requiring Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company to distribute or carry a message it fundamentally 
disagreed with was unconstitutional.81  The Pacific Gas and Electric Company 
was required to carry the message of the Public Utilities Commission in a 
newsletter that it distributed monthly to customers in their bill.82  The Court 
found that corporate entities cannot be compelled to make statements that they 
disagree with83 because the right to speak also provides the right not to speak, or 
in this case, publishing a message it disagrees with.84 
C.  Existing Law has Taken Protection Against Compelled Speech Further, and 
Grants Protection Against Compelled Oaths or Affirmations 
The Court further expanded First Amendment protections against compelled 
speech in Speiser v. Randall.85  This case dealt with a California tax exemption 
form, which allowed World War II veterans to receive a tax break so long as 
they provided an oath or affirmation that they would not advocate overthrowing 
the Federal or California state government.86  Legal action ensued when some 
veterans were denied the exemptions because they submitted the forms without 
their oath or affirmation.87  The veterans who were denied the exemption 
brought suit claiming the required oath or affirmation was a violation of their 
First Amendment rights.88  The Court found that under those facts, requiring a 
claimant to provide an oath or affirmation was unconstitutional.89 
Overall, First Amendment jurisprudence provides that computer code is 
speech, regardless of the type of scrutiny applied to the actual information being 
                                                 
such an interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the 
courier for such message.”  Id. at 717. 
 80. 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986).  
 81. Id. at 18.  Carrying this message not only “burdens appellant’s First Amendment rights 
because it forces appellant to associate with the views of other speakers, [but also] because it selects 
[these] other speakers on the basis of their viewpoints.”  Id. at 20–21. 
 82. Id. at 6–7. 
 83. Id. at 16 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (noting 
that speech made by a corporate entity is still granted First Amendment protection despite the 
characteristic of the speaker)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. 357 U.S. 513, 513–15 (1958). 
 86. Id. 514–15. 
 87. Id. at 515. 
 88. Id.  The lower courts in this case did not allow the Veterans to take the exemption because 
they refused to complete the oath portion of the forms.  The Supreme Court of California affirmed 
the lower courts’ decisions, and rejected the constitutional arguments asserted by the veterans.  Id. 
at 515 n.1. 
 89. Id. at 527–30. 
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conveyed.  Thus, individuals cannot be compelled to create computer code 
because that would be considered speech.  The law also illustrates that requiring 
a person to make an oath or affirmation is a form of compelled speech, and is 
thus per se unconstitutional. 
II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF A MORE INCLUSIVE DEFINITION OF SPEECH IN THE 
TECHNOLOGY ERA INCREASES AS AN ACT OF TERRORISM LEADS TO THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COMPELLING A COMPANY TO “SPEAK” 
AGAINST ITS WILL. 
Following the events of the December 2nd massacre, the FBI conducted its 
investigation in a manner consistent with a terrorist attack on United States 
soil.90  The FBI seized an iPhone 5C, manufactured by Apple, pursuant to a valid 
search warrant for a black Lexus IS300 that was issued on December 3, 2015.91  
The iPhone was owned by the San Bernardino County Department of Public 
Health, who gave authorities consent to search the device which was used by 
Farook under his employment.92  In conducting its search, the government 
sought any pertinent information regarding the shooters involvement in the 
massacre, including others they may have communicated with regarding 
planning and execution.93 
Despite collaboration with Apple, the FBI was unsuccessful in searching the 
device because the iPhone was protected by a “user-determined, numeric 
passcode” and the phone’s operating system had an “auto-erase function.”94  
This function would permanently destroy any information on the phone after 
                                                 
 90. Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, at 2–3, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search 
Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) 
(No. 15-0451M), 2016 WL 680288 [hereinafter Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple 
to Assist]; see also Michael S. Schmidt & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I Treating San Bernardino 
Attack as Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/ 
us/tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html (indicating that Tashfeen Malik’s Facebook post pledging her 
“allegiance to the Islamic State” led the FBI to “treat[] the massacre as an act of terrorism.”). 
 91. Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 90, at 2–3. The 
FBI obtained Mr. Farook and Ms. Malik’s electronic devices, including their computers and 
phones, believing they would “provide the best hope for reconstructing their communications and 
motives.” Schmidt & Pérez-Peña, supra note 90. FBI Director James Comey indicated that they 
were “going through a very large volume of electronic evidence . . . that these killers tried to destroy 
and tried to conceal from us.”  Id. 
 92. Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 90, at 3–5. 
 93. Id. at 4, 19.  As part of its investigation, the FBI conducted searches on the “digital devices 
and online accounts of Farook and Malik” via multiple warrants.  Based on these searches and the 
resulting information, the FBI believed that there was “relevant, critical communications and data 
on [the locked iPhone from] around the time of the shooting . . . [that] cannot be accessed by any 
other means known to either the government or Apple.”  Id. 
 94. Id. at 3–5; see also Volz & Hosenball, supra note 8 (demonstrating that the FBI was 
unable to access the locked phone after two months because of the encryption on the phone, which 
has been a persistent challenge for local law enforcement and national security investigators). 
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entering ten incorrect passcodes.95  Apple has, on numerous occasions, assisted 
law enforcement in executing search warrants to obtain “unencrypted file 
content[s] from phones without [use of] the passcode.”96  However, Apple 
developed new software that was installed on the iPhone seized by the 
government.97  Apple asserted several times that its new software is written 
differently, and a program to provide access without the passcode does not 
exist.98 
Despite Apple’s assertions, the government filed an application for an order 
to compel in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, seeking the court to order Apple’s assistance in executing a search 
warrant to unlock the phone.99  More specifically, “the government request[ed] 
that Apple be ordered to provide the FBI with a custom signed iPhone Software 
(“IPSW”) file, recovery bundle, or other Software Image File (“SIF”) that can 
be loaded onto the [iPhone].”100  The government cited the All Writs Act as 
authority to compel Apple to assist.101 In pertinent part, the government claimed 
that “[p]ursuant to the All Writs Act[102], the [c]ourt has the power, ‘in aid of a 
valid warrant, to order a third party to provide nonburdensome technical 
assistance to law enforcement officers.’”103  Sheri Pym, U.S. Magistrate Judge, 
granted the government’s order pursuant to the All Writs Act on February 16, 
2016, which included a provision allowing Apple five business days to respond 
to the order if Apple determines compliance with the order to be unreasonably 
burdensome.104 
                                                 
 95. Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 90, at 3. 
 96. Id.  In a post answering common consumer questions, Apple clarified that, “[f]or devices 
running the iPhone operating systems prior to iOS 8 and under a lawful court order, we have 
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 103. Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 90, at 11 (citing 
Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
 104. In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on 
a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401, *1–
2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016). 
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Apple filed a motion to vacate the order to compel on February 25, 2016.105  
Apple was concerned that “‘[j]ust this once’ and ‘[j]ust this phone’ . . . [will lead 
to] multiple other applications for similar orders.”106  Furthermore, Apple 
expressed concern that “[o]nce the floodgates open, they cannot be closed, and 
the device security that Apple has worked so tirelessly to achieve will be 
unwound without so much as a congressional vote.”107  In refuting the order, 
which Apple vigorously opposed, Apple claimed that “[t]he All Writs Act . . . 
which the government bases its entire case, ‘does not give the district court a 
roving commission’ to conscript and commandeer Apple in this manner.”108  
Apple stated that “[t]he order would violate the First Amendment” as the code 
sought by the government is “compelled speech and viewpoint discrimination in 
violation of the First Amendment.”109  Apple further asserted that decisions 
regarding protecting the personal safety and privacy of consumers “[are] for 
American citizens to make through the democratic process” rather than through 
the courts.110 
After Apple filed its motion, tech industry leaders expressed their support of 
Apple in the encryption battle and filed legal briefs with the court on March 3, 
2016.111  These companies recognized the importance of Apple’s argument 
against usage of the All Writs Act as well as Apple’s argument regarding 
violation of free speech.112  A common assertion throughout these briefs was the 
need for legislation to adequately address encryption and all of its related issues, 
as opposed to letting courts make a fragmented body of law through case-by-
                                                 
 105. Apple, Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 13, at 1. 
 106. Id.; see also Roberts, supra note 16.  If it were left up to the District Attorney in 
Manhattan, New York, Apple’s assistance in unlocking phones would not just be a one-time 
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internet/. 
 112. Hackett, supra note 111.  Many companies who support Apple agree that the government 
cannot “force companies to create new technology.”  Id. 
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case decisions.113  Many industry entities desired for a solution “that applies 
equally to all holders of personal information,” while allowing “tech companies 
[] to have the ability to build and design their products . . . [without] the 
government mandating” the manner in which companies must go about doing 
that.114  To accomplish the requests of all interested parties, decisions must be 
made clear on underlying legal issues to allow legislation to move forward. 
III.  SPEECH IS STILL SPEECH, REGARDLESS OF THE LANGUAGE IT IS SPOKEN. 
The issue of whether compelling a company to write a computer program 
providing the government with access to information on its devices violates the 
First Amendment has never been addressed.  Before the courts could rule on the 
merits of Apple’s case regarding the San Bernardino massacre and the iPhone in 
question, the government found an alternative way to access the information on 
the cell phone.115  However, just because the government no longer needs 
assistance to circumvent encryption software such as in this case, that does not 
make this issue an anomaly.116  In fact, since the battle between the FBI and 
Apple became public, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr. claims there 
                                                 
 113. Id.; see also Alina Selyukh, The Apple-FBI Debate Over Encryption: A Year After San 
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supra note 10; see also Kevin McCoy & Kevin Johnson, U.S. Demands Apple Unlock Phone in 
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are currently 423 Apple devices that are part of investigations that cannot be 
cracked.117 
The scope of this Note limits the analysis to the legality of the court’s original 
Order to Compel while considering First Amendment concerns of compelled 
speech and compelled affirmations.118  In this case, the order requires Apple to 
create new software to get around their encryption software, and then add its 
“digital signature,” both of which are violations of the First Amendment. 
A.  Not the Threshold, but a Consideration: is the Software Program Object or 
Source Code Speech? 
Apple asserts that the government’s order violates the First Amendment by 
compelling speech,119 which is consistent with previous holdings.  In Junger, the 
court held that “[b]ecause computer source code is an expressive means for the 
exchange of information and ideas about computer programing, . . .  it is 
protected by the First Amendment.”120  The Junger court relied on the 
undisputed fact that encryption source code can convey information and that it 
can be read and understood by individuals familiar with programing language 
for informational purposes.121  Similarly, in In re of the Search of an Apple 
iPhone,122 the code sought by the FBI had the same expressive values.  The FBI 
sought a code for software that removes security features and that additionally 
creates code within the operating system to bypass the encryption.123  The 
possibility that this code can be understood and interpreted by anyone with 
proper experience supports the assertion that, like the code in Junger, the code 
sought by the FBI is source code, warranting First Amendment protection. 
In further support of source code’s expressive value, Apple highlights that 
development of the code sought by the FBI presents a threat to data security due 
to the likelihood that people other than Apple and the government will obtain 
the code and access consumer information.124  More specifically, Apple is 
concerned with hackers obtaining the code. With this information, hackers could 
successfully bypass Apple’s encryption and security features to gain access to 
iPhones.125  The possibility that another person could understand the code is 
consistent with the court’s analysis in Universal City Studios, which deemed 
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source code to be speech, requiring its protection.126  Apple’s fears alone justify 
and support the assertion that the code sought by the government has expressive, 
speech-like values demanding protection under the First Amendment. 
B.  The Government Cannot Compel Apple to Write Code Because it is 
Considered Speech 
Apple correctly asserts that the government cannot compel it to create code 
based on First Amendment precedent.  In Wooley v. Maynard, the Supreme 
Court held “the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment 
against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain 
from speaking at all.”127  The Court held that forcing an individual to publicly 
display an ideal which he or she finds fundamentally unacceptable violates that 
individual’s constitutional rights.128  Apple dissented on several occasions in this 
case, including in a message to its customers and in its Motion to Vacate the 
Order.129  In its message to customers the company states that “[w]e have no 
sympathy for terrorists” but went on to give its reasons why it fundamentally 
contests the government’s demands.130  The letter refers to Apple’s compliance 
“with valid subpoenas and search warrants” that Apple is capable of assisting 
with.131 Apple claimed that “[t]he government is asking Apple to hack [Apple’s] 
own users and undermine decades of security advancements that protect [its] 
customers.”132  The government’s inability to cite precedent or otherwise justify 
the expansion of its authority supports Apple’s opposition.  As justification, 
Apple argued that “this demand would undermine the very freedoms and liberty 
our government is meant to protect.” Apple opposes the order because it does 
not believe in assisting the United States government to overreach its 
authority.133 
The strong language that Apple used indicates that, like the citizens of New 
Hampshire in Wooley,134 Apple is opposed to creating this backdoor for the 
government.  Consistent with the holding in Wooley, forcing an individual, or 
company in this case, to display to the public an ideal that is fundamentally 
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unacceptable effectively violates his constitutional rights.135  Thus, the 
government’s compulsion order effectively violates Apple’s rights. 
C.  The Government is Also Prohibited from Compelling Affirmations in 
Regard to Speech 
To take Apple’s argument a step further, even if the code itself is not 
considered speech, thereby rendering the argument moot, there is another 
argument to be made against compelled speech through affirmations.  While the 
software the FBI requested is one form of speech, the digital signature that Apple 
would need to put onto that software in order for it to be functional is also a form 
of speech.  The iOS system, which runs on the iPhone in question, was created 
with several layers of protection to ensure the highest possible level of security 
to consumers.136  In order for a program to run on the iOS system, it must be 
“‘signed’ cryptographically by Apple using its own proprietary encryption 
methods.”137  The signature certifies that the program is authentic.138  The 
signature, in a way, certifies that Apple approves the program and that it is 
consistent with Apple’s standards and ideals as a company.139  Similar to the 
government in Speiser, the requested order would require Apple to “provide the 
FBI with a custom signed iPhone Software (“IPSW”) file . . .” specifically 
requiring Apple to sign the software the government intends to use.140  In 
Speiser, the court found that it was unconstitutional to require veterans to submit 
an oath or affirmation in order to receive a tax exemption because it compelled 
the veterans to speak.141  In the present case, the government is also requesting 
unconstitutional speech.  It is requiring Apple to place a digital signature on 
software Apple does not agree with, which is a compelled affirmation, and is 
unconstitutional. 
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Consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Pacific Gas,142 the action 
sought by the FBI in this case violates Apple’s First Amendment rights.  In 
Pacific Gas, the Court found that when the company distributed a newsletter 
with specific additions and viewpoints, it appeared as though the company was 
endorsing, supporting, or affirming the views and information distributed in that 
pamphlet.143  Similarly, by requiring Apple to create a software program and 
requiring Apple to sign it, the government is forcing Apple to assert to its 
customers that it supports the creation and use of such a program.144  Such an 
order is unconstitutional. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Apple’s motion to vacate the order compelling Apple to assist agents in a 
search on First Amendment grounds is consistent with established precedent.  
The uncertainty in distinguishing different types of code, source or object, and 
the protections associated with those distinctions need resolutions to ensure that 
no constitutional rights are violated.  Although the Supreme Court has not yet 
addressed the issue of compelling creation of software to bypass encryption, 
Apple’s arguments address issues that are likely to reach the Court in the near 
future.  Yet, courts may not be the best place to decide this matter.  As 
technology rapidly advances, America needs to carefully consider future 
implications that compelling such speech might have on First Amendment law 
and on the rights of citizens. 
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